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I. INTRODUCTION
As a matter of international law, one conclusive criterion of an entity’s statehood (i.e., the legal
status of being a state) is defined by its independent ability to conduct foreign relations with other
subjects of international law.1 That a common and not single European foreign policy exists, in an
intergovernmental form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),2 is a reflection of two
realities.3 The one is that member states of the European Union (EU) intend, as independent
sovereign states, to conduct their own foreign relations. The other is that a single European
foreign policy is an unrealistic prospect,4 despite and because of institutional tinkering in the
Treaty of Lisbon5 to give a semblance of coherence to the CFSP. It is only the fusion of sovereign
states and dissolution of their separate embassies, armies, treaty relations with other subjects of
international law and memberships of the United Nations to form a single (federal) state, which
give substance to a single European foreign policy.6
The CFSP had developed innovatively and pragmatically since its modest start as the European
Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970.7 As the European Community’s (EC) common commercial
policy matured, so the need for a coherent negotiating approach on related matters such as
foreign policy grew.8 Thus began the EPC as a political process, outside the EC framework,
although its discreteness gradually became less evident, as member states drew upon EC
competences to address the foreign policy pursuits in EC policies.9 Then, in the Treaty of
Maastricht (on which the CFSP was created to replace the EPC)10 and Treaty of Amsterdam,11 the
Council12 and European Council13 were granted particular competences in incremental fashion to
act in CFSP matters.14
Previously the CFSP formed one of three pillars that constituted the EU.15 With the Lisbon
Treaty’s entry into force,16 its pillar structure was abandoned. The EU emerged as a single
framework with express legal personality17 and competence to implement a common foreign and
security policy.18 EU member states are bound by a general duty of cooperation to implement all
tasks consequent to the TEU and TFEU.19 This duty is two-fold. First, it calls for loyalty from
1Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 193, which
reflects customary international law.
2This article does not focus on the Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP), which supports the EU’s capacity
to draw on member states’ civilian and military assets for peacekeeping or conflict prevention.
3See EILEEN DENZA, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PILLARS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 33–34 (2002).
4In this respect, see Declarations 13 and 14 concerning the CFSP. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, at 434–35, 6655/1/08, REV 1 (the Final
Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Lisbon Treaty). Both non-binding declarations, which
seemed to have been obtained at the insistence of the British Government, state that the CFSP does not affect
member states’ exercise of their national foreign policies. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE
LISBON TREATY (THIRD REPORT), 2007-8, H.C. 120-i, paras. 20-38 (UK).
5Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) [Treaty of Lisbon ].
6Memorandum of Eileen Denza in HL European Union Committee, The Draft Constitutional Treaty for the
European Union (Session 2002–2003) (on file with author). In this article, the term “independent conduct of foreign
policy” refers to the continued independence of the UK to establish its own army, embassies, and to participate in a
common but intergovernment European foreign policy via its membership of the EU.
7See generally DENZA, supra note 3, at 33.
8DENZA, supra note 3, at 35.
9For example, sanctions against the USSR’s suppression of Poland by using art. 113 of the European Economic
Community Treaty (1957), supra note 3, at 41–42.
10I.e., second pillar under Title V. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) [TEU ].
11Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) [Treaty of Amsterdam ].
12I.e., Council of Ministers. Art. 16(2) TEU.
13I.e., Heads of state or government. Art. 15 TEU.
14The Council was empowered to adopt legally binding CFSP decisions under, for example, art. J.2(2) TEU. The
Treaty of Amsterdam allowed the European Council to adopt legally binding CFSP acts. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra
note 11, at art. 13(2).
15The EC formed the first pillar, which was “supranational” and crucially subject to the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice. The CFSP was the second pillar. The third pillar was Cooperation in Justice & Internal Affairs.
16Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 5.
17Art. 47 TEU.
18Art. 2(4) TFEU, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326).
19Art. 4(3) TEU.
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member states to refrain from unilateral acts which are deleterious to the international actions of
the EU.20 Second, it requires cooperation from member states to ensure unity in the international
representation of the EU on the international plane.21 A specific duty of cooperation concerning
CFSP matters now exists in Article 24(3) TEU, enjoining its member states to develop political
solidarity whose actions shall not impair EU effectiveness as a “cohesive force in international
relations.”
These developments reflect a semblance but are not conclusive of institutional coherence
concerning the CFSP’s position within a single EU framework. This is because the CFSP’s
intergovernmental character is still evident, in at least three ways. First, both constituent
instruments, the TEU or TFEU, conspicuously and explicitly omitted mention of the supremacy of
EU law22 concerning CFSP matters. Second, compared to other EU competences, the CFSP’s
competence within this single EU framework is not expressly enumerated in the TFEU as exclusive,
shared or complementary.23 Indeed, under Article 40 TEU, all EU competences are protected from
CFSP competence and vice versa.24 Third, the exclusion of the Court of Justice of the European
Union’s (CJEU) jurisdiction in CFSP matters further underscores its structural distinctiveness as an
intergovernmental activity.25 In short, CFSP matters involve “high policy” and are conducted
through cooperation between governments of EU member states, i.e., an intergovernmental act
conducted within a single EU framework but whose legal status in relation to the supremacy of EU
law is left unresolved.
To complicate matters, there is a wider perspective to consider in the form of EU external
action.26 The CFSP forms a part of27 and operates within a wider legal framework of EU external
action on the international plane.28 The overarching objectives of EU external action and the CFSP
are distinct yet related29 and subject to Part Five of the TFEU.30 This statement requires some
explanation. Because EU external action and the CFSP are conceptually distinct but in reality
related, we must look to the overarching objectives in the TEU to ascertain their meaning. Article
21(2) TEU contains a set of overarching objectives for EU external action; these clearly include
areas such as development cooperation and humanitarian aid.31 Yet, some overarching objectives
of EU external action are specifically at the heart of CFSP matters (preservation of peace, for
example).32 Other overarching objectives of EU external action, for instance the promotion of
human rights, overlap with CFSP matters in a cross-sectoral manner.33
Finally all these objectives are subject to Part Five TFEU that contains provisions on specific
areas of EU external action such as a common commercial policy, for which the EU has exclusive
20Ruling 1/78, re Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Weapons, Facilities and Transports, 1978
E.C.R. 2151.
21See Opinion 2/91, re Convention No 170 of the ILO, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061, paras. 36–38.
22I.e., EU law is supranational and neither determined nor confined by national laws of member states. See Case
26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
23Arts. 3, 4 TFEU. Although it has been argued to be a “shared” competence, see Ramses A. Wessel & Leonard
Den Hertog, EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: A Competence-Responsibility Gap?, in THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 339, 344 (EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES) (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos
eds., 2013).
24The CFSP’s implementation “shall not affect the application of the procedures and extent of the powers of the
institutions” in the exercise of the EU’s competences. Arts. 3–6 TFEU.
25Art. 275 TFEU. See infra Sections II and V for discussion of potential exceptions.
26As defined under the heading of Tit. V TEU, which states: “general provisions on the Union’s external action and
specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy” [emphasis mine].
27Ch. 2, tit. V TEU. It appeared that the UK had insisted on this structural separation of the CFSP from EU law in
the Lisbon Treaty. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE LISBON TREATY (THIRD REPORT), 2007-8, H.C. 120-
II, at Q 616 (UK) (statement of Javier Solana); FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE LISBON TREATY (THIRD
REPORT), 2007-8, H.C. 120-II, at Q 215 (UK) (statement of Jim Murphy MP); FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 4, para.
94; and non-binding Declarations 13 and 14, i.e., CFSP does not affect the member states’ exercise of their national
foreign policy, obtained by the British Government.
28See ch. 2 tit. V TEU. It appeared that the UK had insisted on this structural separation of the CFSP from EU law
in the Lisbon Treaty. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 27, at Q 616 (statement of Javier Solana); FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE, supra note 27, at Q 215 (statement of Jim Murphy MP).
29Arts. 21(1)-(2) TEU.
30Art. 21(3) TEU.
31Arts. 21(2)(d)-(g) TEU.
32Art. 21(2)(c) TEU.
33Arts. 21(2)(a), (b), (h) TEU (on safeguarding values, support human rights and promote global governance). See
generally PIET EECKOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 167–72 (2d ed. 2012).
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competence to act.34 Since the objectives of EU external action and the CFSP can overlap in a
cross-sectoral manner, few subjects are likely to be purely CFSP matters. In short, CFSP matters
can potentially be subject to EU law, despite its structural distinctiveness as an intergovernmental
activity.35
The CFSP’s current form in the Lisbon Treaty is a result of diplomatic negotiations, more an
afterthought and much less an outcome of deliberate planning. We now know, for instance, that
the British Government received the Lisbon Treaty’s proposed terms on June 19, 2007, prepared by
the EU Presidency under Germany.36 Four days later, EU member states reached an agreement on
June 23, 2007.37 It was political resolve that was obtained. By agreeing an Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC) mandate on June 23, 2007, which formed the exclusive basis for the Lisbon
Treaty’s draft text to be published on July 23, EU member states evinced determination to
complete the vexed process of constitutional reform.38 It was at this stage that the IGC made
explicit its aim of improving the coherence of the EU’s external action,39 implying that further
institutional tinkering was required.40
Against this background, this article draws attention to the potential pressures which bear on
the interplay between: (i) the CFSP’s intergovernmental character; (ii) the CFSP’s current legal
status within a single EU framework that established a semblance of institutional coherence; and
(iii) the implications for EU member states when they conduct their foreign relations, as a
consequence of their legal status at international law as independent sovereign states. To this
extent, this article particularly examines the recent actions of one member state: the United
Kingdom. Long a reluctant European since its accession to the EC, the UK entered late but is a
member state of some importance.41 Of late, it has appeared increasingly disaffected with the
EU.42 The British Government has promised the prospect of a “new settlement” for the UK’s
membership in the EU through a referendum by 2017, subject to significant qualifications.43 The
government’s recent actions illustrate its national response as a EU member state to the pressures
brought about by enmeshing the CFSP’s intergovernmental character, which is still conducted as
an aspect of the UK’s independent foreign policy, with stronger expectations of the CFSP being
conducted within the (apparent) institutional coherence of a single EU structure.
Accordingly, the article examines these pressures through three distinct – but related –
questions, with special reference to the practice both of the EU and UK concerning its accession to
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC):44
1. Despite a semblance of institutional coherence, how does the intergovernmental character of the
CFSP manifest itself as an aspect of the UK’s independent conduct of its foreign relations?
2. Because there is a semblance of institutional coherence, what is the nature of the CFSP in normative
terms when it is applied to Southeast Asia, a geographical zone which is far away from the EU?
3. What are the implications for the UK’s conduct of foreign relations as an independent sovereign
state with Southeast Asia because the CFSP’s intergovernmental character is now enmeshed with
requirements of (apparent) institutional coherence within the EU?
34Arts. 3(1)(e), 4(4) TFEU.
35Art. 24(1) TEU (which provides for the CFSP’s “specific rules and procedures” which are agreed by the European
Council and Council on the basis of unanimity).
36FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at Q 317 (Evidence of Foreign Secretary); FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra
note 28, at Q 217 (Minister for Europe).
37FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 4, paras. 20–38.
38FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 4, para. 23.
39COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, IGC 2007 MANDATE para. 1 (2007), SG/11218.07, POLGEN74.
40It is true that EU member states had indicated since the Laeken Declaration (2001) that the CFSP could be
conducted more coherently with the community pillar. But this concern formed part of a larger debate about
“competence creep” within the EU, which required clarification. See generally Aurel Sari, Between Legalization and
Organization Development: Explaining the Evolution of EU Competence in the Field of Foreign Policy, in EU EXTERNAL
RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-LISBON ERA (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2011).
41Treaty of Accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, Jan. 1, 1973, 1973 O.J. (L 73).
42Hold’ em: Labour’s Leader has made it less likely that Britain will leave the EU, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2014.
43For an overview, see Michael Emerson, Cameron’s Reality Check on Europe (European Policy Institutes Network,
Paper No. 38, 2014), available at http://www.epin.org/new/node/63.
441025 UNTS 15063 Therefore, accession to the TAC by the UK was exercised in parallel by the British Government,
both as a sovereign state and an EU member state. For convenience, I shall call this “parallel accession” throughout
the article.
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The academic approach in this article is largely doctrinal. Therefore, it identifies primary sources
of national (i.e., UK) EU and international law, explains the connection in the rules and principles
between these apparently disparate sources of law, analyses the areas of difficulties, and predicts
future developments.
Section II explains the CFSP’s intergovernmental character in UK law. Two case studies are
instanced here to show how the CFSP’s intergovernmental character is manifested as an aspect of
British foreign policy, nearly five years after the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force. As a matter of
national (UK) law, British foreign relations are conducted by the government as the executive
organ of state. The government’s actions in these areas are considered matters of “high policy,” a
“forbidden territory,” which is generally non-justiciable before the UK courts.45 This is the context
to understand the CFSP’s legal status (as a matter of EU law) within UK laws. Because the CFSP is
still an intergovernmental activity, it is properly the British government which continues to
dominate the implementation of a common European foreign policy. Pressures arise because of
EU’s plans to improve its international effectiveness as a cohesive force in CFSP matters, which are
more ambitious but also more ambiguous. More ambitious because EU member states are legally
obliged in the constituent instruments to promote EU actions on the international plane, but which
would normally involve areas belonging to a “forbidden territory” under UK law. More ambiguous
because the CFSP, despite the EU’s ambitions within this single framework which has a semblance
of institutional coherence, is still an intergovernmental act that recognises the independence of EU
member states, like the UK, to conduct its own foreign relations as sovereign states. Despite the
convergence of ambition and ambiguity, within the UK the CFSP is still conducted as an aspect of
British foreign relations and dominated by the British Government, at the increasing expense of
Parliament and the courts. The two case studies in this section aim to demonstrate the general
and somewhat conceptual approach by the government towards the CFSP.
In contrast, Section III uses as a case study the parallel accession to the TAC by the UK and EU,
two legal persons as separate parties to this treaty, to illustrate the specific approach of the
British Government in conducting the CFSP as an aspect of the UK’s foreign relations. The British
Government views the CFSP as a diplomatic multiplier of and not constraint to conducting British
foreign relations with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
more effectively.46 The parallel accession is a particular example of how the government
addressed the pressures of balancing the CFSP’s intergovernmental character with the added
demands of conducting CFSP coherently within a single institutional framework of the EU. This
case study further exemplified the government’s dominance of the process, in contrast to
Parliament’s participation, which culminated in the UK’s accession to the TAC, at the bilateral (with
Southeast Asia as a region) and multilateral (EU) level.
Section IV explores the potential interlocking of UK law, EU law and international law which
results from the parallel accession by the UK (as an EU member state and sovereign state) and
predicts potential areas of difficulties for the UK’s independent exercise of its foreign relations.
It uses the EU restrictive measure against Myanmar as a case study to demonstrate the connection
between the three sources of law. Additionally, I also argue that the CFSP, as applied to
geographical zones afar such as Southeast Asia, is principally a normative exercise aimed at
projecting “liberal-meliorist,”47 European values that reflect a particular view of international
relations, which it encourages in other states outside the EU as worthy of wider application.
II. THE CFSP’S INTERGOVERNMENTAL CHARACTER WITHIN THE UK
A. Legal status of the CFSP within UK law
As an intergovernmental activity, the conduct of the CFSP is firmly confided to the government
under its prerogative of foreign relations48 – a collection of residual, undefined and discretionary
monarchical powers that had over time passed to the executive branch.49 But it is first necessary
45R (Abassi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2003] UKHRR 76 [106(iii)].
46I.e., Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
47See Christopher Hill, Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap, in A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE (COMPETING
VISIONS OF THE CFSP) 19, 38 (John Peterson & Helen Sjursen eds., 1998).
48R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees-Mogg, [1994] Q.B. 552 [570G].
49See generally PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE, TAMING THE PREROGATIVE: STRENGTHENING MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO
PARLIAMENT, 2003-4, H.C. 4 (UK).
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to state the legal status of EU law in UK law. The general position is that EU law is supreme in the
UK and prevails over UK laws that are inconsistent with it – a statement which it is necessary to
clarify. This constraint on the sovereignty of the UK as an independent state was accepted by
Parliament through implementing legislation, the European Communities Act 1972 (1972 Act).50 EU
law is not entrenched in UK law because it is supreme.51 It is supreme because of incorporation,
dependent on the continuing statutory basis of the 1972 Act.52
In contrast, any provision that is related or can be applied to CFSP matters in the Lisbon Treaty
are expressly excluded in Section 1(2)(s) of the 1972 Act. Qualitatively, CFSP matters are insulated
from the supremacy of EU law, lack a domestic foothold in UK law and consequently are not
directly enforceable.53 The UK’s legal obligations in CFSP matters exist “out there,” on the
international plane. In short, these are international legal obligations, for which the UK is bound
by the government’s actions under the prerogative of foreign relations.
Successive British governments have scrupulously preserved the CFSP’s intergovernmental
character by carving it out from EU law – where its supremacy as a doctrine bites - at least within
UK law in the 1972 Act. It is on this basis that CFSP matters formed an aspect of the government’s
prerogative in foreign relations. It is because of this basis that CFSP matters are still recognised by
Parliament and the courts as broadly part of a “forbidden territory” and therefore non-justiciable.
This view still obtains after the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional attempts to integrate CFSP matters
more coherently within a single EU framework. And it is this change at the EU level, which throws
into relief the relative inability (and willingness) of Parliament and the courts, to induce its
government to account for potential implications of the pressures being exerted on the CFSP, as
an intergovernmental activity within a single and (apparently more) institutionally coherent EU
framework.
B. Case Study 1: Review of the balance of competences between the UK and
EU 2012 (2012 Review)54
The Government’s recent actions laid bare its institutional advantage in conducting foreign relations
at the expense of Parliament and the courts. These were calibrated concessions to improve public
accountability of its actions. Some correlation between form and emphasis are apparent in the
Government’s actions under examination in this section: just as it emphasised the CFSP’s potential
for competence creep in UK law, so the legal form on which it bore emphasis is weaker.
In its 2012 Review, the government: (i) defined “competence” as “everything deriving from EU
law that affects what happens in the UK”;55 (ii) acknowledged the CFSP’s potential competences as
“wide-ranging”;56 and (iii) intimated that in CFSP matters the balance of competences would be
actively influenced by the CJEU.57 But this Review was only an analytical exercise. At the time of
writing this is an ongoing – and comprehensive – assignment to appraise the consequences of
UK membership since its admission to the EC in 1973.58 The government stressed that policy
recommendations or alternative models of British relations with the EU are not expected to ensue
from this Review.59 The collected evidence (certainly in Foreign Policy) was scrupulously presented
as “signposts,” without prejudice to future actions that the government might adopt.
50Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport (No 2), [1991] 1 A.C. 603 at 658; Thoburn v. Sunderland City
Council, [2003] Q.B. 151 at 158–59.
51Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
52Section 18, European Union Act 2011 (UK), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/.
53JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1990] 2 A.C. 418 at 500B-D.
54SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND EUROPEAN UNION 2012 [2012 REVIEW], available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/35431/eu-balance-of-competences-review.pdf. See generally Michael Emerson & Steven
Blockmans, British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’ (EPIN, Working Paper
No. 35, 2013), available at http://www.epin.org/new/node/63.
552012 REVIEW, supra note 54, at 13.
56Annex 2, 11, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Call for Evidence: Foreign Policy Report, GOV. UK, Nov. 28, 2012,
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/foreign-policy-report-review-of-the-balance-of-competences.
57SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND EUROPEAN UNION 38, PARA. 3.19 (2013) [REVIEW 2013].
58Many areas of EU law are covered in this broad review, see foreword by Foreign Secretary, 2012 REVIEW, supra
note 54.
592012 REVIEW, supra note 54, at 12.
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The government wanted to determine in the 2012 Review whether cooperation in the CFSP
added value to British interests, compared to unilateral action or engagement at other
international fora.60 It said: “ . . . the global context challenges us to look afresh at the boundaries
between what the EU does and what the UK does and whether current arrangements are in the
UK’s national interest.”61
In other words, the CFSP is regarded as one of various diplomatic tools at the UK’s disposal to
facilitate the conduct of British foreign relations. It is a multiplier of but not substitute for British
interests. This concern was preponderant in the evidence that was collected for the Foreign
Policy62 and Development Reports of July 2013.63 Both Reports emphasised the political and
diplomatic outcome, for the UK, of conducting its foreign relations within the institutional
framework of the CFSP and EU external action.64 Where CFSP matters overlapped with EU external
action – for instance, restrictive measures against Myanmar and Iran - unanimity at the European
Council was required.65 Against both states, the UK’s foreign relations carried greater (moral)
authority through association with the EU than bilateral engagement.66 Another example
concerned EU-USA relations.67 On matters of strategic dialogue with the US, the UK
benefitted from the EU’s collective diplomatic weight to assert its foreign policy positions on - for
instance - the desirability of a code of conduct between ASEAN and China over the South
China Sea.68
The CFSP’s structural distinctiveness received little attention. That no bright line separated CFSP
matters from external action was hailed as indicating comprehensiveness of EU action on the
international plane.69 The government exerted a creditable attempt in the 2012 Review to review
the balance between an independent conduct of British foreign relations and CFSP cooperation –
only if we accept its characterisation in political terms of the CFSP as a multiplier for British
interests. But in legal terms, at least on foreign relations, the Reports did not assess how far,
nearly five years after the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, the CFSP within a single EU framework is
still subject to international legal methods.70
The European Commission has insisted that the EU’s “internal order” is separate from
international law and the relationship between EU and its member states are governed by EU law,
a “distinct source of law.”71 This observation about the supremacy of EU law is not new but the
claim about its separateness from international law is another – and more controvertible –
matter. This is because now the EU also has “important law-based foreign relations powers that
have a tendency to develop over time,”72 which a previous British Government claimed to have
safeguarded when it ratified the Lisbon Treaty for the UK.73 Against this background, it is clear that
the Reports did not (want to) address implications for the UK’s independent conduct of foreign
relations when the CFSP’s intergovernmental character is increasingly enmeshed into the
requirements for greater (and apparent) institutional coherence of a single EU framework.
602012 REVIEW, supra note 54, at 5.
61Call for Evidence: Foreign Policy Report, supra note 56.
62REVIEW 2013, supra note 57.
63DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND HUMANITARIAN AID REPORT: REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF
COMPETENCES (2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/development-cooperation-and-
humanitarian-aid-report-review-of-the-balance-of-competences.
64See also the government’s list of indicative questions to facilitate consultation. Call for Evidence: Foreign Policy
Report, supra note 56, at 5.
65On the importance of unanimity, see FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at Q 575, 577 (evidence of FCO
legal adviser Paul Bergman).
66On Myanmar and Iran, see REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, at 41–42, 47–49.
67REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, at 57, 52–55.
68REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, at 52. See also US-EU Statement on the Asia-Pacific Region (July 12, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194896.htm.
69REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, paras. 6.5, 57, 89; DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 63, 37–38.
70REVIEW 2013 noted that “few competence issues were raised at this stage with regard to mixed or largely
exclusive TFEU areas of external action” although evidence would be collected for specific areas such as energy and
trade.” Supra note 57, para. 6.4, 88.
71See comments of the European Commission to the International Law Commission in Responsibility of
International Organizations (Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations), para. 106 at
20-21, UN Doc. A/CN.4/637 (Feb. 14, 2011).
72Id. at para 1, 7.
73FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 28, paras. 20–38.
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Recall that “competence” was broadly defined by the government as “everything of EU law”
that affected the UK. It also acknowledged as “wide-ranging” the EU’s potential competence to
act in foreign affairs”:74 but except a concise account of the complex connection between TEU
and TFEU provisions, there was scant analysis of its legal consequences for the UK.75 Still more
strikingly, the CJEU’s increasingly crucial - and politicised - role in defining the boundaries of
competences between the EU and member states were recognised, though tersely, and without
elucidation.76
C. Case Study 2: European Union Act 2011 (2011 Act)
A complex and technical statute,77 the 2011 Act appeared to address the same matter of reviewing
the CFSP’s intergovernmental character as an aspect of British conduct of its independent foreign
relations. The government adopted a different approach, in a “harder” form of primary legislation.
Through a hierarchy of referenda “locks,” the government aimed in this Act to improve
accountability by changing the way it agreed, on behalf of the UK, to EU Treaty changes or
decisions.78 “Extensions” of CFSP competences through treaty changes or decisions may not be
agreed by the government, without some degree of parliamentary scrutiny or even public approval
in a plebiscite. Despite the form, its emphasis on (an “extension” of) competence is circumscribed.
A narrow meaning of an “extension” in CFSP competence was adopted in the 2011 Act, occurring
only upon an express amendment of the TFEU, which triggers the referendum requirement under
Section 2(1).79 Because (the government argued) competences were expressly granted by member
states to the EU in the TFEU, and since EU bodies could only act within those areas of
competences, an “extension” only occurs when there are express amendments to those already
conferred by member states in the TFEU.80 We must also be mindful that the 2011 Act is
inapplicable if the government, exercising its prerogative, were to reject such Treaty changes at
the outset.81
The government insisted that an “extension” within the 2011 Act did not include the CJEU’s role
in interpreting CFSP competences, and dismissed concerns about its ability for activism in
bolstering the EU’s role as an international legal person.82 In this respect, Section 4(f)(ii) is a
curious provision, which states:
4 Cases where treaty or Article 48(6)83 decision attracts a referendum
(f) the extension of the competence of the EU in relation to—
(ii) common foreign and security policy;
Because the TFEU only determined the fact and not type of competence for the CFSP, it is not
easy to see how Section 4(f)(ii) would be applied to trigger a referendum. Article 40 TEU preserved
the CFSP’s competence from other competences, namely Articles 3 to 6 TFEU. Any consequent
attempt to protect CFSP competences, under Article 40 TEU, must necessarily entail an articulation
of what it is in relation to other EU competences, which have been defined in the TFEU -
ineluctably a task for the CJEU. How does one assess within the 2011 Act whether an “extension”
74Call for Evidence: Foreign Policy Report, supra note 56.
75See REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, at Appendices A & B.
76The most direct discussion of the CJEU’s role is contained in REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, paras. 3.19, 6.6, 38, 39.
77This Article only addresses the issues that implicate CFSP competences and the government’s prerogative of
foreign relations. For comments on this Act’s broader impact on EU law and UK constitutional law, see Paul Craig,
The European Union Act 2011: Locks, limits and legality, 48 CML REV. 1915 (2011); Jo Murkens, The European Union Act
2011: A Failed Statute (Law Society Economy, Working Paper No. 3/2013), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collecti
ons/law/wps/WPS2013-03_Murkens.pdf.
78HM GOVERNMENT, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR GOVERNMENT 19 (2010).
79TFEU, supra note 18, para. 20. All section numbers here refer to the 2011 Act.
80TFEU, supra note 18, paras. 23–24.
81Para. 21 TFEU.
82HC EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE EU BILL: RESTRICTIONS ON TREATIES AND DECISIONS RELATING TO THE EU (FIFTEENTH REPORT)
para. 50 (2010-11); id. at paras. 37–38 (FCO written evidence in this report).
83Art. 48(6) TEU allows for revision to Part 3 of the TFEU, which relates to EU internal policies action. These
decisions are “simplified revision procedures” because it does not require an intergovernmental conference and are
regarded as “greasing the wheels of EU integration” procedures. HL SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION; (13TH REPORT),
EUROPEAN UNION BILL 6 (2010–11).
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of a CFSP competence had occurred, when its competence had not been defined in the TFEU, and
that any prospective meaning ascribed to it by the CJEU is excluded?
A silver lining exists in Section 5(3). The executive must make a “required statement” whether in
the “Minister’s opinion,” the treaty change falls under Section 4.84 The “extension” of CFSP
competence under the 2011 Act (if at all) is one matter; but perhaps Section 5(3) might offer more
parliamentary scrutiny over the government’s conduct of foreign relations in the CFSP.
A government is presumed to be fallible and therefore accountable.85 When necessary, Parliament
can plausibly invoke Section 5(3) to elicit a formal legal position on the CFSP’s (evolving)
competence from the government. To the extent that the CFSP is subject to international legal
methods, the government’s statement under Section 5(3) will form the UK’s interpretation of CFSP
competence, which might be relevant as supplementary means of interpretation on the
international plane.86
The 2011 Act is an exemplar of the government’s considerable institutional advantage in
conducting foreign relations, compared to the coordinate organs of state. Under Section 4(4)(a)
referenda is averted if a treaty change or decision merely involves the codification of practice in
the TEU or TFEU, which relates to the previous exercise of an existing competence.87 Obviously, in
matters of foreign relations it would be the government that is well-placed, with its vital access to
diplomatic resources and legal advice, to determine any such codification.
To assure Parliament that Section 4(4)(a) would be applied in good faith, the government
introduced the words “genuine” and “simple” to differentiate the type of codifications. “Genuine”
codifications are not “extensions” under the 2011 Act, and therefore exempt from a referendum.88
Article 189 TFEU was used as an example.89 This provision formed the legal basis for a
European space policy, “not a simple codification,” and would trigger a referendum because the
previous competence90 for the Galileo programme was based on a general provision on research
and technological development.91 Contrarily, provision of macro-financial assistance to Albania was
a “simple” (i.e., “genuine”) example of codification under the 2011 Act.92 Funds were first
dispersed in 2004 under Article 352 TFEU. This enabling clause was used a further seven times to
provide similar assistance to other states. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty codified this practice in
Articles 212 and 213 TFEU to cover economic, financial and technical cooperation with third
states.93 Parliament perceptively observed that it is more likely that competing interpretations of
“codifications” under Section 4(4)(a) would be resolved in favour of EU institutions.94
To recapitulate: both case studies, the 2012 Review and 2011 Act, represented efforts by the
government to review, since the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, the CFSP’s intergovernmental
character as an aspect of its continued but independent conduct of British foreign relations.
To ensure maximum flexibility for the exercise of its prerogative in foreign relations, these actions
were calibrated in terms of form and emphasis. Unless Parliament is resolved to obtain
independent legal advice for the purposes in the 2011 Act, the government would remain most
able to monitor any codification of practice. It is the executive branch’s assessment (i.e., the
required statement, of whether they are genuine or simple codifications) on which Parliament
generally depend. On the other hand, the 2012 Review is a governmental document that
collected selective facts about the nature of CFSP competences and its political advantages for
British foreign policy. Though the evidence might constitute a vital aid to foreign policy-making,
this is neither an inevitable outcome nor realistic possibility, at least after the General Election
in 2015.
84I.e., includes sec. 4(f)(ii).
85HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 414 (4th ed. 2000).
86Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [Vienna Convention ].
87Para. 62 TFEU.
88HC EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE EU BILL: RESTRICTIONS ON TREATIES AND DECISIONS RELATING TO THE EU: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO THE COMMITTEE’S FIFTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2010–11 (SECOND SPECIAL REPORT) para. 27 (2010–11).
89Id. at para. 24.
90I.e., Title XVIII of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC).
91HC EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, supra note 88, paras. 24–25.
92HC EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, supra note 88, para. 26.
93HC EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, supra note 88, para. 26.
94HC EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, supra note 82, para. 49.
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III. BALANCING THE CFSP’S INTERGOVERNMENTAL CHARACTER WITHIN A SINGLE EU
FRAMEWORK
A. Current UK foreign policy concerning Southeast Asia
There has been a recrudescence of British diplomatic interest in Southeast Asia under the government
of Prime Minister David Cameron.95 The government’s energetic conduct of foreign relations with the
region of Southeast Asia sought to advance its national interests,96 with a focus on generating
prosperity for the UK.97 There is recognition that an economic balance of power had shifted in favour of
the emerging powers in Southeast Asia. Diplomatic engagement with the region must be meaningful
and substantive and go beyond the characteristic impulse to balance the influence of Japan and China
as regional powers.98 Its accession to the TAC must be understood in this context.
The Foreign Secretary disavowed any prospect of “outsourcing” its foreign policy to the
European External Action Service.99 British interests would not be advanced on its behalf by
others.100 Where there are common goals, however, the CFSP is regarded by the government as
exerting a multiplier effect to benefit British interests.101 This is why it agreed to a parallel
accession (i.e., both as EU member state and sovereign state) to the TAC. As evidenced in the
2012 Review, the UK is confident of its latitude to enter alliances (with the EU, or not) to sustain
its diplomatic objectives.102 On this basis, its exercise of the prerogative is still unconstrained even
if a conflict arises between the UK’s specific foreign relations goals and CFSP cooperation within
the (apparent) institutional coherence of a single EU framework. This is possibly less the
unassailable position than it once was because of the potential interlocking of UK law, EU law and
international law, which the rest of this section explains.
B. The TAC as lex specialis and its potential interlocking with UK and EU law
The TAC is a foundational treaty of ASEAN.103 It established a binding – and regional – code of
conduct in treaty form to govern inter-state relations in Southeast Asia.104 During the Cold War,
this marked an indigenous attempt by non-communist ASEAN member states to develop friendly
relations with communist non-ASEAN states (particularly Vietnam), and to fashion a minimum legal
standard of peaceful coexistence in Southeast Asia. Quite possibly, the code of conduct first found
expression in an early document105 related to the ASEAN Declaration of a Zone of Peace and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, which preceded the conclusion of the TAC.106 More pertinently, it was
in this document that the prohibition against intervention in the internal affairs of a state (“non-
intervention principle”107) featured prominently as an ingredient of an ASEAN code of conduct.108
95The FCO has reopened its embassy in Laos after 27 years and also increased its diplomatic strength in
Myanmar, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. See William Hague, The Role of the Foreign
Office (Sept. 2011) (transcript available at http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2011/09/08/william-hague-forei
gn-office-speech-in-full).
96Looking East: UK-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century, FOREIGN SECRETARY WILLIAM HAGUE Annex 1 (Dec. 2011),
http:www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06543.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).
97For a range of the trade activities, see statements by Foreign Secretary, Strengthening UK relationships in Asia,
Latin America and Africa to support UK prosperity and security (Apr. 2012); Minister of State for Foreign Office, The UK
and Southeast Asia Annex 2, n.96 (July 2012); Minister for Europe, HC Deb vol. 549, col. 20 (Sept. 2012).
98Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Jeremy Browne MP, British Competitiveness: Responding to the Rise of the
Emerging Powers, Apr. 24, 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/british-competitiveness-responding-to-the-
rise-of-the-emerging-powers.
99Art. 27(3) TEU. See also Council Decision 2010/427/EU, July 26, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 201/30).
100Hague, supra note 95.
101REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, paras. 1.4–1.6, 13–14.
102REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, para. 1.4.
103Daniel Seah, The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Issue of Non-Intervention and its
Accession by Australia and the USA 11 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 785 (2012).
104At international law, a “code of conduct” might be associated with non-binding agreements and thus anomalous
in the context of the TAC, which is binding. But the word “code” (Penal Code, for example) is not itself conclusive of
its binding quality. Id. at 790.
105“Guidelines that would constitute a code of conduct covering relations among States within the Zone and with
States outside the Zone.” These 14 guidelines formed the basis of an embargoed ASEAN Senior Officials Report on
developing ZOPFAN, which eventually led to the TAC: Seah, id. at 792–793.
106Reproduced in HEINER HANGGI, ASEAN AND THE ZOPFAN CONCEPT 25 (1991).
107This principle only potentially proscribes non-forcible activities; intervention that involved the use of force would
be addressed by art. 2(4) of the UN Charter, which is not the focus of this article.
108Especially Guidelines 4 & 5. HANGGI, supra note 106.
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Most importantly, its adoption as Articles 2 and 10 TAC,109 reflected consent in treaty form by
ASEAN member states to a specific aim of proscribing non-intervention in their internal affairs,
forged during the Cold War, but derived validity from general international law. Subject to what
would be written shortly, this is a form of regional lex specialis: a legal technique of resolving
apparent conflicts between differing but potentially applicable rules or principles.110 ASEAN
member states had consistently endorsed the TAC as a code of conduct for peaceful inter-state
relations,111 an expression which it is argued here constitutes subsequent practice under the
General Rule of the Vienna Convention.112
The significance of the code of conduct is also supported by ASEAN’s practice of accession to
the TAC, a precondition of admission as a member state to the organisation.113 A regional pattern
of acceptable inter-state conduct had been established to proscribe intervention in each other’s
internal affairs, opposable to states in Southeast Asia.114 Canonical principles of international law
are embedded in this code of conduct: the sovereign equality of states;115 territorial integrity of
states;116 and pacific settlement of disputes.117 The TAC as a code of conduct, of which the non-
intervention principle is a component, supports international law by facilitating stable, friendly
relations in Southeast Asia on a multilateral basis with sovereign states.
For these reasons, accession to the TAC by non-ASEAN states118 had long been urged by ASEAN
member states. It would reflect in treaty form firm commitment to “ASEAN values” (i.e., its code of conduct
in inter-state relations) and engagement with Southeast Asia. It is unlikely to constitute subsequent
practice119 in the absence of consistent acceptance120 by the UK and EU, as non-ASEAN parties.
As supplementary means, however, accession by the UK and EU to the TAC suggests that there
is legal recourse to the code of conduct as confirmation121 of the non-intervention principle’s
meaning. The principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation also requires that the ASEAN code
of conduct be given meaning, by taking into account the object and purpose122 of the TAC in
maintaining peaceful inter-state relations within Southeast Asia. In short, there exists the potential
for derogation from general international law or EU law because the TAC has normative priority as
a form of regional lex specialis.123
Different (though also related) consequences potentially arise for the UK, with implications for its
independent conduct of British foreign policy. Through its parallel accession, the UK has to
balance this independence preserved by the CFSP’s intergovernmental character, with its
obligations under EU law to conduct the CFSP under the (semblance of) institutional coherence
within a single EU structure. And it is the normative, liberal-meliorist values of EU external action
as contained in the TEU and TFEU, potentially in conflict with the TAC’s code of conduct as
lex specialis, on which we assess the enmeshing of the CFSP within a single EU structure and the
109Respectively, art. 2(c) and art. 10 state: “Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another” and “Each High
Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the
political and economic stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party” [emphasis
added].
110I.e., lex specialis derogat legi generalis. See generally Arnold Pronto & Michael Wood, Fragmentation of
International Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1999–2009) (VOLUME IV: TREATIES, FINAL DRAFT ARTICLES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS) 653 para. 66 (2010).
111For evidence of practice at ASEAN Summits and the ASEAN Regional Forum, see Seah, supra notes 43, 85, 103.
112I.e., Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 31(3)(b).
113For dates of accession to the TAC before admission as ASEAN member states, see Seah, supra note 103, at n.42.
114See infra Section V for elucidation of the content of “internal affairs,” which is proscribed by the non-intervention
principle.
115Art. 2(a) TAC.
116Art. 2(a) TAC.
117Ch. IV TAC.
118This has also included accession by other subjects of international law such as the EU, as an international
organisation.
119Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 31(3)(b).
120On consistency of acts to establish agreement of subsequent practice, see Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
AB-1996-2, 12–13.
121Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 32.
122Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Merits, 1994 I.C.J. 6, paras. 51–52.
123As a source of law, treaties ordinarily prevail because it is more specific. See Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at para. 105 (Apr. 13, 2006); JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (8th ed. 2012).
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UK’s independent conduct of its foreign relations. This is the background to the legal issues that
emerge from accession by the UK and EU to the TAC, to which we now turn.
C. Parallel accession by the UK to the TAC: Dominance of the British Government in the
conduct of UK’s foreign relations with Southeast Asia
To begin with, the TAC had already been laid before Parliament in 2007 by a previous government.124
That was intended to be an accession by the UK but the Labour Government decided against it, then
partly influenced by less than handsome relations with Myanmar.125 In 2012, the TAC was again laid
before Parliament, under a separate command paper.126 There was no scrutiny of the TAC for the UK’s
interests before its Foreign Affairs Committee. Instead, Parliament was indirectly apprised of the
government’s motivations for accession to the TAC for the UK,127 through scrutiny of the EU’s accession
to the same treaty.128 Finiteness of parliamentary time was undoubtedly a practical constraint. Inevitably
salient questions that particularly bear upon the UK’s accession were not raised before the European
Scrutiny Committee.129 It was not clear, for example, whether the government made interpretative
declarations to the TAC on behalf of the UK. Other non-ASEAN states such as Australia and the United
States had expressly excluded their legal obligations connected to the non-intervention principle in the
TAC.130 Though the present government did not directly address the matter of interpretative declarations,
the explanatory memorandum (EM) of 2007 suggested that, upon accession, formal understandings
would be communicated to ASEAN to clarify the UK’s interpretation of the TAC.131
The government’s invocation of a scrutiny override underscored its institutional advantage in
conducting foreign relations. Before Parliament formally considered this accession, the government
had already agreed to the EU’s accession to the TAC, as befitting its entitlement under the
prerogative. Consequently the EU acceded on July 12, 2012; whereas Parliament only debated the
accession on September 4, 2012. The FCO Minister explained that the government had deemed an
override necessary because if the EU accession were delayed (by the UK Parliament), that would
be inimical to British interests bilaterally with ASEAN and multilaterally within the EU.132
The matter of CFSP competences exercised Parliament. It sought clarifications from the
government whether – and to what extent - the UK had retained its “competences” under the
prerogative of foreign relations: that is to say, the bundle of broadly undefined powers related to
conducting foreign relations, for which the EU might also exercise as a competence under Title V
of TEU, i.e., CFSP.133 Parliamentary scrutiny was lackadaisical. Either because Parliament was
unable or unwilling, it did not frame the debate usefully by raising the “technical” legal questions.
For instance, the Council Decision of April 2012 that approved TAC accession by the EU was not
purely a CFSP act.134 Articles 37135 and 31136 TEU were applied together, which contained the CFSP
component in this decision. But external action was invoked: Article 209(2) TFEU137 enabled the
Union to conclude “any agreement” (i.e., TAC) to achieve the objectives in Article 21 TEU138 and
Article 208 TFEU.139 Here the government was not meaningfully pressed to explain the legal
1242007, Cm. 7196.
125HC Deb, supra note 97.
1262012, Cm. 8294.
127UKTS 043/2012.
128I.e., before the European Scrutiny Committee, HC Deb, supra note 97.
129HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 11–12.
130Seah, supra note 103, at 800-12.
131Under “reservations and declarations” of the 2007 EM, the UK would upon accession record the following
“understandings” that the TAC: (i) does not affect the UK’s rights and obligations in other bilateral or multilateral
agreements; (ii) must be interpreted in conformity with the UN Charter; (iii) will not apply to or affect the UK’s
relations with states outside Southeast Asia. 2007, Cm. 7196, supra note 124.
132HC Deb, supra note 97, at col. 9.
133HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 3–19.
134Council Decision 2012/308/CFSP of 26 April 2012 on the accession of the European Union to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Apr. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 154/1).
135The EU can conclude CFSP-related treaties under ch. 2 TEU.
136Unanimity provision within the Council.
137This broadly covers development cooperation under Title III: “Cooperation with third countries and humanitarian
aid.” Development cooperation is a shared competence under art. 4(4) TFEU.
138Includes the overarching principles and objectives that drive EU external action.
139Art. 208(1) provides that development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of external action’s
principles and objectives.
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consequences, which arise upon the UK’s parallel accession to the TAC. Simply put: how well did
the government protect British interests in this instance by striking a defensible balance between
CFSP cooperation and its independent conduct of foreign relations?
When Parliament did raise “technical” queries, it was not always on point. It asked the
government whether the EU had competences to act in trade or development cooperation,140
under Chapter III of the TAC.141 Now these activities do potentially engage the shared or exclusive
competences under external action,142 but such cooperation between ASEAN member states and
the EU was already conducted bilaterally and – significantly - outside the TAC framework.143
Non-ASEAN signatories outside Southeast Asia acceded to the TAC to demonstrate their political
commitment to accept in treaty form a binding code of conduct, an “ASEAN value” of inter-state
relations.
Of course, the government was not obliged to steer Parliament’s questions to a more useful
frame of reference. It responded that for mixed agreements such as the TAC it was not standard
practice to delimit the competences of the EU and member states.144 It reiterated that the EU
could only act within the expressly defined spheres of competences in the TEU and TFEU,145 the
same justification used to exclude the CJEU’s role in “extending” competences under the 2011 Act.
It replied that EU accession under the CFSP did not preclude accession to the TAC by member
states in their own right.146 It reassured Parliament that the government would be vigilant in
“policing” the competence boundaries between the EU and UK by pushing for timely discussion in
the Council, should the need arise.147
In one sense, it was difficult for the government to be more forthcoming. Competences related
to EU development or trade cooperation, for instance, which also implicated the government’s
exercise of the prerogative, could only be assessed on a case-by-case basis when (and if) they
were conducted pursuant to the TAC.148 The Minister cited an example of cooperation under Article
9 TAC (i.e., the promotion of peace and stability in Southeast Asia)149 a paradigmatic CFSP matter
but also belonging to the government’s prerogative to conduct foreign relations. Any discussion
under Article 9 TAC, the government averred, would engage Articles 21–46 of TEU:150 this actually
covers Title V TEU in its entirety, effectively and prospectively involving the competences of CFSP
and external action.
As indicated in the Foreign Policy Report, if operating under CFSP’s framework, the EU is able to
support member states’ foreign policy interests - in human rights protection to promote regional
stability, for instance - then participation within the Union is an advantage. This is a multiplier for
British interests.151 Yet this Report also conceded that the amorphousness of CFSP competences,
(probably) advantageous in political terms, created practical problems of representation either by
EU or its member states.152 Hence the government explained that if Article 9 TAC were discussed
at an EU-ASEAN meeting, then the executive branch would determine whether the UK would
participate in its own right or be content to allow the EU to speak on its behalf.153 Another
question arises: does this example of CFSP development under the TAC constitute “genuine”
codification of practice and never “extensions” under Section 4f(ii) of the 2011 Act?
140HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 4 & 9; EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE (61ST REPORT), FCO 33748: COOPERATION WITH
SOUTHEAST ASIA paras. 2.9–2.10, 2.16–2.17 (2012).
141I.e., art. 4 TAC (cooperation in economic, social and technical fields under).
142In any event, Council Decision 2012/308/CFSP explicitly affirmed these competences on the basis of art. 212
TFEU.
143See Bilateral Partnership Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) were agreed with Indonesia, COM (2013) 0230 final,
Philippines, 2012 O.J. (L 134/3), and Vietnam, 2012 O.J. (L 137/1). A Cooperation Agreement (CA) was concluded with
Brunei, 1985 O.J. (L 81), Laos, 1997 O.J. (L 334), Cambodia, 1999 O.J. (L 269).
144HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 11–12.
145HC Deb, supra note 97, at col. 12; EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, supra note 140, para. 2.13.
146HC Deb, supra note 97, at col. 6.
147HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 7 & 11.
148HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 12–13.
149HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 6–7.
150HC Deb, supra note 97, at col. 6.
151REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, para. 6.1.
152REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, para. 2.44.
153HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 6–7.
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IV. THE POTENTIAL INTERLOCKING OF UK LAW, EU LAW & INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST MYANMAR
A. EU engagement with Southeast Asia & ASEAN through normative values
Since 1977 the EU had engaged Southeast Asia as a dialogue partner through ASEAN.154 Perhaps
because of the geographical distance between the EU and Southeast Asia, the scope of EU actions
is limited. First, to make good its non-existent political role in Southeast Asia,155 the EU has been
providing technical assistance to ASEAN.156 This supplied the basis to deepen trade links and thus
balance the regional influence of Japan and China.157 Second, EU actions are innately normative as
befits the CFSP’s objectives of promoting a set of EU values which it is encouraged as worthy of
wider application by less democratic states in the Third World (human rights, for instance).158
It is against this background that we examine the apparent rapprochement between the EU and
Myanmar.159 Previously the EU had registered its opprobrium against an absence of democracy in
Myanmar and serious breaches of human rights by its government through restrictive measures.160 These
were punitive though mainly ineffective161 sanctions that targeted members of the military government or
its affiliates.162 Though ineffective in reality, there was no doubting its normative high-mindedness as
expressed through the CFSP, which said: “ . . . the restrictive measures . . . are instrumental in promoting
respect for fundamental human rights and thus serve the purpose of protecting public morals.”163
No foreign policy can be entirely devoid of normativity. That the common European policy as it exists in
the CFSP articulates an understanding of democratic participation to contain particular requirements of
inclusivity, an implication that it is ultimately desirable for regional and international relations, is reflected
in the 2010 restrictive measure: “ . . . the absence of substantive progress towards an inclusive
democratisation process, notwithstanding the promulgation of a new electoral law and the
announcement of the Government of Burma/Myanmar of multi-party elections to be held in 2010 . . . .”164
As for EU member states, they may not act contrary to the restrictive measures which are
“ . . . incompatible with the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, which are common to the Member States.”165
Since 2012, the EU suspended all restrictive measures against Myanmar, retaining only an arms
and equipment embargo to prevent internal repression by the Myanmar Government.166 In 2013
the restrictive measure was lifted, again retaining the arms and equipment embargo.167 Despite the
improved relations between the EU and Myanmar, the CFSP objective as expressed in the recent
154See generally Chien-Huei Wu, The Evolution of EU-ASEAN Relations: Legal Framework and Policy Change, 8 NAT’L
TAIWAN U. L. REV. 329 (2013).
155I.e., the EU has a limited role in the ongoing South China Seas dispute. See generally Anja Jetschke & Carla
Portela, ASEAN-EU Relations: From Regional Assistance to Security Significance, EU-ASIA CENTRE, Apr. 1, 2013,
http://eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id¼93.
156One example is the e15 million ARISE project (ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU), which would
include technical assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat, economic integration policy and customs matters. See
Overview of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org/news/item/
overview-of-asean-eu-dialogue-relations (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
157Regional strategy for Asia 2007–2013, European Commission Communication, at 5, COM (2008), available at
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/asia/r15016_en.htm.
158Id. at 4, 11. See especially A New Partnership with Southeast Asia, European Commission Communication, at 9,
COM (2003) 399/4, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_116277.pdf.
159The EU and Myanmar: A New Chapter in Bilateral Relations, European Union Fact Sheet, COM (2013) 131021/02,
available at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131021_02_en.pdf.
160See Council Regulation (EC) No 194/2008, Feb. 25, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 66/1).
161See generally Robert Howse & Jared Genser, Are EU Trade Sanctions on Burma Compatible with WTO Law?,
29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 165 (2008). Cf. REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, at 42–44 (which rated the sanctions more favourably).
162Council Regulation (EC) No 194/2008, supra note 160.
163Council Regulation (EC) No 194/2008, supra note 160, at Recital (6).
164Council Decision 2010/232/CFSP of 26 April 2010 renewing restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar,
Apr. 26, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 105/22) Recital (3) [emphasis added].
165Council Regulation (EC) No 194/2008, supra note 160, at Recital (8).
166Council Decision 2012/225/CFSP of 26 April 2012 amending Decision 2010/232/CFSP renewing restrictive
measures against Burma/Myanmar, Apr. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 115/25); Council Regulation (EU) No 409/2012 of 14
May 2012 suspending certain restrictive measures laid down in Regulation (EC) No 194/2008 renewing and
strengthening the restrictive measures in respect of Burma/Myanmar, May 14, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 126/1).
167Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP of 22 April 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma and
repealing Decision 2010/232/CFSP, Apr. 22, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 111/75); Council Regulation (EU) No 401/2013 of 2 May
2013 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Myanmar/Burma and repealing Regulation (EC) No 194/2008,
May 2, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 121/1) art. 3.
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restrictive measures are still normative in nature: to disable the Myanmar Government’s capacity to
carry out “internal repression” by prohibiting technical or financial assistance related to military
activities and equipment, save for uses concerning humanitarian purposes.168
Because these democratic principles underpin the single EU framework, the CFSP’s normativity
has some legal basis which potentially involves the CJEU through judicial review under Article 275
TFEU. Therefore, this section uses the restrictive measure against Myanmar as a case study to
illustrate potential areas of difficulties for the independent exercise of foreign relations (and the
CFSP as an aspect of its prerogative) by the British Government, through the interlocking of
EU law, UK law and international law.
B. The involvement of the CJEU in CFSP matters through judicial review of
restrictive measures
The legality of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons is subject to review by the
CJEU - one of two (new) exceptions, after the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, to its lack of
jurisdiction in CFSP matters.169 Restrictive measures, such as those against Myanmar, are adopted
pursuant to a CFSP measure by the Council; followed by the Council agreeing a regulation, acting
by qualified majority, on a joint proposal of the High Representative of the EU and Commission.170
This two-step system highlighted the CFSP’s intergovernmental character by preserving member
states’ capacity to conduct foreign relations on their own terms, if they wished.
Now this is potentially being eroded by Article 275 TFEU. That the EU has “important law-based
foreign relations powers,” as the European Commission had commented, which have a “tendency to
develop over time” is an observation of some salience.171 Article 275 TFEU directly empowers the CJEU
to review an annulment action against a restrictive measure for illegality.172 It assigns to the CJEU the
task of monitoring boundaries between CFSP and other EU competences, under Article 40 TEU. Its
procedural status as a direct action prompts another question: is there a concomitant jurisdiction in
Article 267 TFEU, an “implied” conferral of competence, on the CJEU to give preliminary rulings on the
validity of restrictive measures?173 A key question, not conclusively decided despite the CFSP’s
structural distinctiveness, is the issues of high policy which are putatively justiciable before the CJEU.
These issues bear upon the conferral of competences to EU bodies (i.e., CJEU) which legitimately
constitute “everything deriving from EU law that affects what happens in the UK.”174 They deserved
careful attention but were omitted in the 2012 Review and 2011 Act.
As a legal person, a sanctioned state like Myanmar175 is able to challenge the legality of the
2013 restrictive measures,176 on grounds of proportionality. Whether the condition of standing is
satisfied under Article 263(4) TFEU is a matter of legal submission before the CJEU - a formidable
hurdle,177 but not the key point here. It is the availability of legal avenues for legal persons to
challenge matters of high policy that is in point, much less the outcome or political reality of
seeking judicial review.
Not only is proportionality a general principle of EU law, it is also an established ground of
judicial review.178 By lifting its previous restrictive measures, the 2013 sanction intended as an
objective to encourage the Myanmar Government to continue its policies, which in the EU’s
168Now see the renewal of the 2013 restrictive measure in Council Decision 2014/214/CFSP of 14 April 2014
amending Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma, Apr. 14, 2014, 2014
O.J. (L 111/84).
169Art. 275 TFEU.
170See Council Decision 2012/225/CFSP, supra note 166, at Recital (3); Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP, supra note
167, at Recital (2); Council Decision 2014/214/CFSP, supra note 168, at Recital (2), which renewed Council Decision
2013/184/CFSP.
171UN Doc. A/CN.4/637, supra note 71.
172For recent case law by CJEU concerning annulment on the basis of democratic scrutiny, see infra note.
173Recall all CFSP matters are excluded under Section 1(2(s), 1972 Act, supra note 52. On preliminary hearing, see
Maja Brkan, The Role of the ECJ in the Field of CFSP after the Treaty of Lisbon, New Challenges for the Future, in EU
EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-LISBON ERA 97, 111 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2011).
1742012 REVIEW, supra note 54.
175On this point, see infra note.
176Art. 275, second paragraph TFEU.
177For requirement of legal or natural persons to demonstrate the restrictive measure is of “direct concern” and
does not entail implementing measures (i.e., regulation), see Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 95.
178Art. 5(4) TEU; TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136 (2d ed., 2006).
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assessment had produced positive changes.179 So it is arguable that the type of prohibitions left
in the 2013 sanction is disproportionate to its objective. Crucially and pertinently, the content of
these prohibitions form the legal toehold on which to apply the TAC as a code of conduct – a
relevant factor in evaluating proportionality.
C. Interlocking of the TAC as regional lex specialis under international law with judicial
review under EU law: Human rights considerations
The EU had on accession accepted the obligations in the TAC,180 now an integral part of the
Union’s legal order.181 Interpretation by the CJEU of the laws in this legal order has an “internal”
quality.182 There exists in EU law an internal hierarchy such as primacy, direct applicability and
effect, although it is unclear whether CFSP acts are now appropriately interpreted under the
supremacy of EU law, or still subject to international legal methods and, therefore, structurally
distinct in this single legal order. Rather than coexistence within this legal order, it is appropriate
to characterise the TAC as subject to the Union’s primary laws, its constituent treaties.183 The
Union’s conduct of external action is driven by an overarching set of principles in the TEU - such
as the indivisibility of human rights184 and fundamental freedoms.185 The EU exacts a duty of
cooperation from EU member states for CFSP matters.186
The TAC does not contain similar principles although it is – certainly - arguable that this is a
living international instrument, for the following reasons. Qualitatively the TAC as a code of
conduct had changed since the adoption in 2012 by ASEAN member states of the ASEAN
Declaration of Human Rights (ADHR).187 The ADHR is not binding. This is a regional framework for
the protection of human rights.188 Despite its form, ASEAN member states made commitments that
are binding under international law: on slavery;189 torture;190 and international human rights
instruments, to which they are parties.191 Protection of human rights within this regional framework
is subject to two vital qualifications: the different political and cultural backgrounds of all member
states;192 and ASEAN member states bear primary responsibility in protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms.193
One salient question that Parliament did ask of the government during the TAC scrutiny debate
touched on the implications of Article 10 TAC.194 Recall that this provision (potentially) proscribed all
activities, which threatened the political and economic stability of ASEAN member states.195 The
government argued that Article 10 was not a legal constraint on the UK or EU.196 Commentaries on
political conditions that occurred in any ASEAN member state, even if these fell within their internal
affairs, would not breach an acceding state’s obligations under Article 10.197 This argument has
179Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP, supra note 167, at Recital 2.
180Art. 216(2) TFEU.
181Case 181/73, Haegaman, 1974 E.C.R. 449.
182Allan Rosas, International Responsibility of the EU and European Court of Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES) 139 (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013).
183I.e., TEU and TFEU.
184Art. 21(1) TEU.
185See especially art. 6(1) TEU on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which states that the Charter carries
the same weight as the constituent TEU and TFEU. Art. 6(3) TEU further states that the Charter reflects the
constitutional traditions of EU member states.
186Arts. 4(3), 24(3) TEU.
187The ADHR is an outcome of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, which in turn was
formed pursuant to Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter (a constituent treaty), for which the Charter endorsed the TAC in
art. 2, available at http://aichr.org/documents/.
188Id. (Phnom Penh Statement on the adoption of the ADHR).
189ADHR at art. 13.
190ADHR at art. 14.
191ADHR at Preamble, art. 40.
192ADHR at art. 7.
193ADHR at art. 6 [emphasis added]. The word “responsibility” in art 6 ADHR is a duty, which should be
distinguished from the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. The term “primary responsibility” is
retained throughout this article because it is the ADHR’s language, but this distinction between a duty and
responsibility as a secondary rule of international law must be kept in mind.
194HC Deb, supra note 97, at cols. 14–15.
195Supra note 109.
196HC Deb, supra note 194, at cols. 7 & 19.
197Cf. HC Deb, supra note 194, at cols. 14–15 (Martin Horwood MP’s statement).
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particular force in UK law. It is much easier to state that the non-intervention principle reflects
customary international law,198 but much harder to pin down the content of “internal affairs,” to
which this principle applies. And if we accept that the TAC had established a regional lex specialis,
then, does the non-intervention principle in Article 10 offer stronger protection against
encroachments to the internal affairs of ASEAN member states, compared to customary international
law? It is fortunate that we might avoid these considerations in UK law. As an unincorporated treaty
and thus devoid of a domestic foothold in UK law,199 accession to the TAC, which does not confer
rights on individuals,200 was only intended to be politically meaningful for enhancing relations
between the EU, UK and ASEAN.201 To emphasise this point, the government cited as an example the
suspension of EU “smart sanctions”202 against Myanmar in April 2012, explaining that during the
decision making Article 10 TAC “did not feature in any way.”203 Furthermore, UK relations with
Myanmar – whether bilaterally or within the EU - plausibly fall within the strategic fields of foreign
policy, for which UK courts acknowledge the government’s special responsibility204 and on these
matters strive to speak with the same voice as the executive branch.205
On the other hand, the EU’s legal position with respect to the TAC is different. The 2013
restrictive measure expressly stated as an objective, the lifting of past sanctions to encourage the
Myanmar Government to continue its positive policies.206 If so, are the prohibitions against
technical or financial assistance on equipment proportionate to this objective?207 Technical
assistance was defined and proscribed very broadly.208 The Union’s “encouragement” could have
gone all the way, by suspending these residual prohibitions. It is at least arguable in law, though
perhaps pushed to its acceptable limits, that fundamental freedoms and human rights in Myanmar
are not constructively protected by EU fiat, through a sanction, but by the Myanmar Government,
for which it bears primary responsibility.209 International human rights are not only the institutional
concerns of the EU but, since the ADHR, also for ASEAN. A principal issue is regional
differentiation. Because the EU’s competence in CFSP matters covers all areas of foreign policy,210
the CJEU is not likely to resile from ensuring that international agreements (i.e., TAC) are
compatible with EU law – a role it performs seriously and justifies, in Article 275 TFEU, the basis
for its rigorous review of EU restrictive measures. Its compatibility (or not) between the two
systems is a matter of legal and judicial assessment, but matters related to human rights are also
acts of high policy in the conduct of foreign relations between states or international
organisations.211
198Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res 2625 (XXV), (Oct. 24, 1970); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 202 & 245.
199Attorney Gen. v. Nissan, [1970] AC 179 at 216F-G; JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and
Industry, supra note 53.
200Cf. unincorporated treaties can be interpreted by UK courts when they are relevant for determining rights and
obligations of parties under UK statutes or common law. R (CND) v. The Prime Minister, [2002] All E.R. (D) 245, [36].
201HC Deb, supra note 97, at col. 5.
202I.e., Council Decision 2012/225/CFSP, supra note 166.
203HC Deb, supra note 97, at col. 19.
204R (Al Rawi and others) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279,
[147].
205British Airways v. Laker Airways, [1984] Q.B. 142, C.A., [193D]; Lonrho Exports Ltd v. Export Credits Guarantee
Department, [1999] Ch. 158, [179D-E].
206See Recitals in Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP, supra note 167; Council Regulation (EU) No 401/2013, supra
note 167.
207Council Regulation (EU) No 401/2013, supra note 167, at arts. 3(2)(a) & (b) prohibited technical or financial
assistance on military-related equipment to any legal or natural persons, entity or body in Myanmar. Given the nature
of the prohibited equipment (listed in Annex 1), it is clear that this 2013 restrictive measure targeted the Myanmar
Government, a legal person, and the only effective authority within Myanmar capable of deploying the prohibited
equipment on a large scale. For this reason, as indicated before, it is arguable that the Plaumann test of direct
concern was fulfilled because the restrictive measure was directed at the Myanmar State, acting through and
represented by the government, which was differentiated and could not be carried out by any person at any time.
Case 25/62, supra note 177.
208Council Regulation (EU) No 401/2013, supra note 167, at art. 1(4) includes obvious operational support in
assembly and maintenance, but also includes consultancy and even verbal forms of assistance.
209ADHR at art. 6. The UN Security Council had also not adopted sanctions against Myanmar.
210Art. 24(1) TEU; European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, [2012] Case 130-10 para. 62.
211I.e., statement in November 2012 by US State Department on compatibility of the ADHR with universal human
rights, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200915.htm.
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The Council had attempted the argument that its broad discretion in determining political facts
for restrictive measures could not readily be substituted by the CJEU.212 It failed. Where treaties do
not appear to establish a sufficiently progressive standard, EU law seemed to prevail over
established international agreements, such as the Chicago Convention.213 Even the maintenance of
international peace and security had to be balanced with an individual’s fundamental rights
protected under EU law,214 though the CJEU did not elucidate in high policy what - if any -
manageable legal standards exist on which to strike this balance.
Given this lack of diffidence by the CJEU to review acts of high policy, the TAC could be
assessed for compatibility with general principles of EU law. As indicated already, the ADHR is part
of an ASEAN code of conduct, for which the latter, in turn, constitutes for the EU supplementary
means215 of interpreting TAC provisions. We might instance the content of “internal affairs” under
Articles 2(c) and 10 TAC as an example. The prohibitions in the 2013 restrictive measure, which
proscribed even verbal forms of assistance, targeted possibilities of internal repression by
Myanmar’s Government. Whether this constitutes an intervention in Myanmar’s “internal affairs”
under the TAC as a code of conduct could require–as supplementary means of confirming its
meaning– recourse to the ADHR. Already the ADHR had assigned the primary responsibility of
protecting fundamental freedoms to ASEAN member states (Myanmar).216 Its realisation is subject
to political and cultural particularities in Southeast Asia;217 and the process that facilitates its
realisation must avoid double standards and politicisation, but instead embrace non-confrontation
and accountability.218 In its entirety, all these elements clarify as subsequent practice219 the
agreement of ASEAN member states to the content of “internal affairs” as contained in the non-
intervention principle, which is left open-textured under Articles 2(c) and 10 TAC. Pertinently for the
EU, these elements are specific and conterminous with the TAC as a code of conduct - a regional
lex specialis – on which the Union’s obligations owed to the TAC might be evaluated.
If they were so inclined at a political level, the EU and UK could fashion a position of studied
ambivalence about the AHDR, to maintain strategic engagement with Southeast Asia. After all,
human rights are only declaratory EU priorities with non-neighbourhood entities such as ASEAN.220
Without a domestic foothold in the UK, TAC matters (including the ADHR), which could be
connected to British relations with Myanmar and ASEAN, fall within the government’s prerogative
of foreign relations – most likely a “forbidden territory.” The UK Supreme Court did not overrule
the settled law that UK courts cannot enter the “forbidden territory” by interfering with executive
decisions that implicate foreign policy,221 even when it concerned the extraterritorial reach of
habeas corpus, a profoundly important constitutional matter.222
Now when we compare the CJEU’s role in assessing the restrictive measure for proportionality,
the differences are manifest. The legal instrument that supported EU accession to the TAC is based
on the TEU and TFEU. So in assessing whether the sanction’s objectives are proportionate to its
prohibitions, the court has to finesse the conundrum of Article 40 TEU – to ensure that the
implementation of CFSP acts and external action do not affect their respective competences within
the context of a single legal order. Despite this delimitation of boundaries in competences, the
CJEU lately ruled in Case C658/11 that because the EU is founded on democratic principles, so its
external action (and CFSP matters) on the international plane must bear democratic scrutiny by the
relevant institutions.223 In this case, the CJEU held that in concluding an agreement between
the EU and Mauritius on conditions of transfer of suspected pirates, the Council failed to inform
212Pye Phyo Tay Za v. Council of the EU, [2012] Case C-376/10 P paras. 38–39.
213Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, [2011] Case
C-366/10; case note by B. Mayer, 49 CML REV. 1113 (2012).
214European Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, [2013] Grand Chamber para. 87.
215Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 32.
216ADHR at art. 6.
217ADHR at art. 7.
218ADHR at art. 9.
219Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 31(3)(b).
220REVIEW 2013, supra note 57, para. 3.48.
221R (Abassi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 45. But the scope of judicial
review in this area has grown. Dominic McGoldrick, The Boundaries of Justiciability, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 981, 1015
(2012).
222Rahmatullah v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Affairs, [2012] U.K.S.C. 48 [65–70].
223European Parliament v. Council, [2014] Case C-658/11 paras. 79 & 81.
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the European Parliament about the process of concluding this agreement under Article 218(10)
TFEU. Therefore, Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP was annulled for breaching the procedural
requirement under Article 218(10) TFEU, which reflected the “fundamental democratic principle”
that the decision-making process concerning EU external action must be scrutinised by the
European population through Parliament as its representative intermediary.224
Thus there exists awkward prospects for EU-ASEAN (and UK-ASEAN) political relations if judicial
determinations yield a finding of incompatibility between the ADHR and general principles of EU
law, especially its Charter of Fundamental Freedoms. Consider this alternative scenario. If the
restrictive measure were ruled disproportionate by the CJEU because the prohibitions do not
respect Myanmar’s primary responsibility in protecting fundamental freedoms, is it incompatible
with the EU’s normative (and possibly differing) standard of protecting similar rights under
international law in a non-restrictive and adverse manner?225 Therefore, how extensive is a court’s
role as decision maker in high policy concerning CFSP matters within a single EU framework,
though still an aspect of the independent conduct of British foreign relations?226 On this matter,
both the CJEU and UK courts have been similarly engaged but they are not similarly disposed in
terms of ascertaining the “legal edge” between executive and judicial functions.227
V. CONCLUSION
Some years ago, in 1999, Eileen Denza observed how the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties tried
to contain the CFSP’s intergovernmental character by drawing “a clear line in the sand” to preserve
the competence of member states, as independent sovereign states, in their conduct of foreign
relations.228 When Denza reappraised this matter again in 2004, the attempts by member states to
provide for the CFSP’s intergovernmental character were no longer described as drawing “a clear
line in the sand” but instead “lines in the sand”.229
To this extent, this article has provided an account of how one EU member state in particular -
the UK - has attempted to make sense of and enforce these “lines in the sand,” as an aspect of
their independent conduct of foreign relations. It instanced two case studies (the 2011 Act and
2012 Review) to illustrate the general and somewhat conceptual approach of the British
Government in preserving the CFSP’s intergovernmental nature. Next, the UK’s parallel accession to
the TAC aimed, as another case study, to show a specific approach of the government to address
the pressures of balancing the CFSP’s intergovernmental character with the added demands of
conducting CFSP coherently within a single EU framework. Finally, this article attempted to predict
potential difficulties of drawing these “lines in the sand” by exploring how UK law, EU law and
international law can potentially interlock, which results from the parallel accession by the UK. The
normativity of CFSP actions in faraway geographical zones, such as Southeast Asia, and its
prospective basis for judicial review by the CJEU are also considered, with implications for the
flexibility with which a British Government might wish to conduct its own foreign relations
(perhaps deviating from CFSP values) with this region.
If we accept the general presumption that a government is fallible and should be held to
account (these days it seems increasingly anomalous to presume otherwise),230 then it is
remarkable how the conduct of the CFSP as an intergovernmental act within the single EU
framework continues to be dominated by the British Government and largely on its own terms
within the UK. Equally, for all its normative high-mindedness, a union that is meaningfully founded
on particular values231 of equality232 and the rule of law233 could not base its CFSP on these
amorphous “lines in the sand,” leaving open an avenue for the CJEU to review EU acts for legality,
224Id. at para. 81.
225Art. 53 (level of protection), EU Charter of Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 185.
226R (Al Rawi and others) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 204.
227R (Al Rawi and others) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, supra note 204, at [148].
228Eileen Denza, Two Legal Orders: Divergent or Convergent, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 257, 283 (1999).
229Eileen Denza, Lines in the Sand: Between Common Foreign Policy and Single Foreign Policy, in EUROPEAN UNION
LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: RETHINKING THE NEW LEGAL ORDER 259 (Takis Tridimas & Paolisa Nebbia eds., 2004)
[emphasis added].
230HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 85.
231Art. 3 TEU.
232Art. 2 TEU.
233Art. 2 TEU.
Page 19 of 20
Seah. International Review of Law 2015:1
whereas the UK courts are more diffident and less likely to enter areas encroaching on a
“forbidden territory.” If accountability in the conduct of British foreign relations improves because
of the CJEU’s involvement at its base in Luxembourg, a consequence of the UK’s legal obligations
under the CFSP, it follows that we should reflect on the state of democratic governance in the UK.
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